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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

c;. Jl.
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*
*
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*
*

*

v.
CULF 01 L CORPORATION, a
Pennsylvania corporation and
the UTAH
BOARD OF OIL,
GAS AND
an Agency of
the State of Utah,
Defendants and
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*
*
*
*

Case No, 19144

*
*
*

*
*

*
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an action brought by Bennion in the
lower court wherein Bennion contested the validity of an
administrative order entered by the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining in Cause No. 139-20, October 3, 1980 as amended in Cause No.
IJ9-20[B], October 22, 1981.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The trial court denied Bennion's motion for summary
J 1Jdgment and granted Gulf's cross motion for Summary judgment on the

•rounds that the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acted

properly and within its authority as to matlers complained

<)f

by

flennion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Gulf 011 Corporation, seeks affirmation of the
lower court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Gulf.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With the exception of those matters hereinbelow specified,
Respondent agrees with and accepts Appellant's statement and
characterization of the facts.
On or about August 25, 1980, the Utah State Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining (hereinafter referred to as the "Division") gave
approval for:
Gulf to drill the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well, as
an infill test well •.• within the area
spaced under the order issued in Cause No.
139-8. The above well was approved as a
60-day test drilling well and the Division's
letter disallowed simultaneous production of
the test well and the Albert Smith #l-8C5
well which is presently under production,
beyond the period of testing allowed by the
Division.
(R. at p.155)
Thereafter, Bennion petitioned the Division to enjoin the
drilling of the Albert Smith 2-i:lC5

as being violative of the

Board's spacing order in Cause No. 139-8.

(R. at p. 155).

The issue

was ultimately resolved before the Board in Cause No. 139-20 (dated
October 3, 1980), wherein the i:loard concluded, inter alia, that the

·Jntinued operation of the Albert Smith #2-8C5 test well during the
"l'l1rovecl bO-day test period did not violate the Oil and Gas
ion Act nor the board's order in Cause No. 139-8.

(R. at

1)9 and 181).
On page 4 of its brief, Appellant characterizes the Albert
Srn1

th 2-8C5 Well as a "test" well.

The record clearly establishes

that this well was in fact an infill test well.

(R. at pp. 15 and

I SS).

After expiration of the 60-day test period, simultaneous
production from the Albert Smith 1-8C5 Well
2-8C5 Well was expressly disallowed.

and the Albert Smith

(R. at pp.

15, 155 and 159).

lt was equally clear that upon notice and hearing, the Albert Smith
2-8C5 Well could be and was so designated as the production well for
rhe subject drilling/spacing unit.

(R. at pp. 160-161 ).

To ensure

that both wells would not simultaneously be producing after the
bu-day test period, Gulf shut-in the Albert Smith 1-8C5 Well on or
aoout March 1 0, 1981,

(R. at pp. 200-202 and p. 211) and thereafter

petitioned the Board to designate the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well as the
producing unit well for the subject drilling unit.
Respondent objects to Appellant's statement on pp. 4 and 5
of its brief that at the April 30, 1981 hearing before the Board
[Cause No. 1J9-20(B)], only certain selective evidence was introduced

3

pertaining to the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 and No. 2-8C5 Wells.
Actually, the state production reports pertaining to both wells were
also introduced into the record for the period of January - March,
1981.

(R. at p. 236).

Further,

it was the testimony of an expert

witness, relating to the size of the reservoir, etc.,

that:

We have no idea of what the extent of the
reservoir is.
We can't know that at this
time.*** It's almost impossible to
determine what's going to happen from one well
to the next as far as correlating sands and
production.
[R. at 203, 204 - Transcript of Hearing for Cause No. 139-20(B) testimony of Mark Anthony].
Respondent strenuously objects to appellant's use and
interpretation of production data relating to the two wells as
contained on pages 5 and 6 of its brief.

We ask this Honorable Court

to consider the following chronology:
April 30, 1981:
October 22, 1981:

January 10, 1982:
December 31 , 1 982:

January 4, 1983:

Hearing before the Board of Oil, Gas
and Mining, Order in Cause No. 139-20.
Date of Order in Cause No. 139-20(B)
which reaffirms the Order in Cause No.
139-20 retroactive to April 30, 1981,
but for purposes of appeal not entered
until October 22, 1981.
Complaint filed in Cause No. C-82-458
appealing the Board's Order in Cause
No. 139-20 (B).
Date of Affidavit of Stephen W. Rupp
which contained as attachments thereto
annual monthly production reports of
the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5 Well for the
years 1981 through September, 1982.
Argument held by the lower court on
parties' cross motions for summary
j udgrnent.
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Wells.

oth wells were

March 3

1 983:

March 3

1 983:

ary - March,
March 1 7

of an expert

1 983:

that:

Mr. Rupp' s Affidavit of December 31,
1982 filed in the Clerk's Office in
Civil No. C-82-458.
Lower court's Memorandum Decision
granting Gulf's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Judgment of the lower court granting
Gulf's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denying Bennion's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

We ask this Court to note that the only evidentiary hearing
in this matter was conducted by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on

well
nd

139-20 (B)

April 30, 1981.
-

At that hearing, the only evidence introduced as to

production records was that relating to the months of January to
March, 1981, as to the two wells (Tr., Cause No. 139-20(B), R. at

s use and

wells as

Honorable Court

236).

The lower court in Civil C-82-458 did not conduct a trial de

novo; it heard counsel argue the merits of their respective motions
for summary judgment.

We submit that the filing of Mr. Rupp's

December 31 ,-1982 Affidavit on March 3, 1983 - the day of the trial
of Oil, Gas
se No. 1 39-20.
o. 139-20(B)
r in Cause No.
ril 30, 1981,
al not entered
No. C-82-458
der in Cause
phen W. Rupp
hrnents thereto
n reports of
CS Well for the
rnber, 1982.
er court on
or summary

court's Memorandum Decision - is a novel approach to the introduction
of evidence.

In presenting this factual data for the first time on

appeal, Appellant violates the well known rule that matters neither
raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial court level (in
this case, the Board of Oil, Gas
the first time on appeal.

& Mining) cannot be considered for

Walton v Walton, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah

1978); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 705 (1971);
IJgesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456, 457
(1%2).
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The chronology outlined above demonstrates:
impropriety of Appellant's statement:

(a) the

"After the April 30 hearing

the production of the second well steadily decreased until the well
was no more and usually considerably less than production from the
first well when shut in

(App. Brief, page 4); and (b) the fallacy of

Appellant's concluding sentence:

"This fact [the knowledge of

declining production after the April 30 hearing] was evident before
the Board ruled" (App. Brief, page 4).
Unless the Board was blessed with an extra sensory
perception, it seems unreasonable to ask it to consider on April 30,
1981, matters which were yet to transpire.
We reject out of hand Appellant's statements of these
"facts" and ask this Court to consider the salient issues presented
by this appeal and to disregard the irrelevencies appellant would use
to cloud the real matters at hand.

ARGUMENT

I.

CIVIL NO. C-80-7024 - RES JUDICATA

By Complaint dated September 9, 1980 Bennion (Appellant
herein) initiated a civil action before the Third Judicial District
Court (S.H. Bennion v. Gulf Oil Corp., Civil No. C-80-7024) praying
for a temporary order restraining Gulf Oil Corporation from the
continued drilling of the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5 Well; Bennion also
prayed that the Court, upon final hearing, permanently enjoin Gulf

b

u1l Corporation, its agents, etc., from the continued drilling of
said well under the present spacing scheme authorized under the Order
in Cause No. 139-8.
On September 24, 1980, the Court continued the matter in
Civil No. 80-7024 and remanded it for hearing by the Board of Oil,
Gas & Mining for a ruling on the following issues:
(a)

Did the Division have authority to grant the exception

location to allow the drilling of a test well in this matter?;
(b)

Should the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well be enjoined from

operation as being in violation of the Board's Order in Cause No.
139-8 or section 40-6-6(c), U.C.A. 1953?; and
(c) If, in the alternative, approval to drill the infill
test well was properly granted, what allocation of cost should be
made with respect to the production of said well?

(R. at 93).

In response to the Court's direction, the Board, on
September 25, 1980, convened an emergency hearing which resulted in
the issuance of its Order in Cause No. 139-20 holding that:

(1) the

Board and Division had a mandate under Section 40-6-1 of the Oil &
Gas Conservation Act to maximize recovery of oil and gas from the
Bluebell-Altamont Field and that the Division was acting within the
scope of its delegated authority to approve the Albert Smith No.
2-8C5 as an infill test well;

(2) that the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5

was a test well, rather than a production well, the continued
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operation of which, during the approved test period, did not violate
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act nor the Board's Order in Cause No.
139-8 and the drilling thereof should not be enjoined; and (3) that
the plaintiff as a nonconsenting owner was not required to pay any of
the costs of drilling such well at that time, whether the Gulf test
well was a dry hole or a producing hole operating during the 60-day
period.

Said Order was issued on an emergency basis and was to

remain effective for 15 days from the date of issuance with any
objection to the Order to be received not later than October 17, 1980
with the further stipulation that the Board, in the absence of
objection, would accept the Emergency Order as a final Order at the
Board's October 23, 1980 hearing.

Said order in Cause No. 139-20 was

dated October 3, 1980 (R. at 6-13).
Oneer a Stipulation, Motion and Order for Dismissal, the
parties to Civil No. C-80-7024 stipulated that an order be entered in
said cause dismissing the action with prejudice and on the merits
upon the grounds, that said action had been rendered moot and the
issues raised therein decided by the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining.
Said action was dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits with
each party to bear its own costs.

(R. at 99).

The issues raised by appellant in the lower court in Civil
C-82-458 are moot and have been settled by the Emergency Order of the
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Hoard of Oil, Gas & Mining dated October 3, 1980, as reaffirmed by
the Board on October 22, 1981.
The matters raised in Civil No. C-82-458 (the case on
appeal to this Court) are res judicata.

The Order of Dismissal of

october 8, 1980 in Civil C-80-7024 was predicated upon the
stipulation of the parties which specified "that an Order may be
entered in this cause dismissing the above entitlted action with
prejudice and on the merits upon the grounds that said action has
been rendered moot and the issues raised herein decided by an
emergency order of the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining dated October 3,
1980**".

(R.at99).
The Order of the Court in dismissing Civil C-80-7024 was

dispositive of the issue as to whether the Utah State Board of Oil,
Gsa & Mining erred as a matter of law in determining that the
drilling of the Albert Smith 2-9C5 infill test well was appropriately
approved.
The Order of the Court in Civil C-80-7024 was dispositive
of the question as to whether said Board erred as a matter of law in
designating the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well as the unit production well
within the parameters of those strictures imposed by the Division
against its simultaneous production with the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5
Wel 1.
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Said Order of Dismissal in Civil C-80-7024 was also
dispositive of the question as to whether the Utah State Board of
Oil, Gas & Mining erred as a matter of law in determining that
Bennion was required to pay Gulf llil Corpor;;.tion, as operator, any
part of the drilling, completing or equipping costs of the Albert
Smith 2-8C5 Well.
Since the matters raised in Civil No. C-82-458 have been
decided in Civil No. 80-7024 and have been found moot, and the issues
decided by Emergency Order dated October 3, 1980, Appellant became
bound by that Order.

We are not talking about a single issue or

several issues; we are talking about the issues in that litigation
which went to the heart of the Division's authority to authorize the
drilling of the second well, allocation of costs, etc.

This appeal

should, accordingly, be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

II.

CIVIL NO. C-82-458

It is important to consider what Bennion sought in his
appeal from the Board's Order.

In his prayer in Civil No.

C-82-458 Bennion asked the Court to set aside the Order of the Board
(the Order in Cause No. 139-20(B)) and asked that it remand said
cause to the Board directing:
(a). That the production and operation of 2-8C5
Well is presently being done in violation of
Section 40-6-6, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, Rule
C-4 and the September 20, 1972, Order
establishing the drilling unit, and that the
well should therefore be shut-in and the
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Be
conclusion o
expertise an
Cause No.

original production well in said section be
reinstated as a designated production well for
Section 8.
(R. at 5).
Bennion was asking the lower court to disregard the
conclusion of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (predicated upon its
expertise and the evidence adduced) expressed in its Order entered in
Cause No.

139-20 that:
State and Federal regulatory authorities, as well
as those individuals with an interest in
producing oil and gas from the Greater Altamont
Bluebell Field in which the wells in controversy
are located, have been aware of the fact that
application of present drilling techniques under
the current spacing pattern will result in only a
9% recovery of the oil in place in that
reservoir. To promote the greatest possible
economic recovery of oil and gas from this
region, the Board and Division have permitted
numerous experiments, the drilling of test wells
within the 640 acre unit to determine whether the
Board's 640 acre spacing of this field was
draining the area in the most effective manner.
For example, Shell Oil Company was permitted to
drill two experimental infill wells in the field
on the basis of experimental 320 acre spacing.
After testing these wells over a period of time,
Shell Oil determined the area was being drained
by the original wells and the test wells were
uneconomic for that particular area. These test
well have been shut-in to protect the correlative
rights of others in compliance with the terms of
the experimental permit issued by the Board and
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. In the present
case, it is postulated that due to the fact that
the present Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well is not
highly productive that a new infield well may
drain the 640 acre tract more effectively and
recover sufficient additional oil to be an
economic well. Therefore, consistent with the
mandate of the Board and Division to promote
greater ultimate recovery of this resource, as
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long as there exists a possibility for recovery
for a
reater ortion of the 90% of the oil in
p ace o this
ield, it is a pol icy o
the Board
that every effort should be made by the Board and
Division to maximise sic] recover
in this area.
However, where such e orts prove unsuccess ul,
test wells will be shut in to protect the
correlative rights of other interest owners in
the field.
(Emphasis supplied].
(R. at 8-9).
In other words, Bennion was asking the lower court to
re-legislate the statutory mandate given to the Board,

i.e.:

***to foster, encourage, and promote the
development, production and utilization of
resources of oil and gas in the state of
Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to
authorize and to provide for the opeartion and
develo ment of oil and as ro erties in such a
manner that a greater u timate recovery o oi
or gas may be obtained and that the correlative
ri hts of all owners be full
rotected***.
Section 40-6-1 U.C.A.
953
as amen ed
(E:nphasis ours).
What Bennion sought was an order directing the Board to
make an order for which it lacks authority to enter; he was asking
the lower court to order the Board to defy the mandate of the
leg is Liture.
In the State Land Department vs. Painted Desert Park,
3 Ariz. App. 568, 416 P.2d 989 (1966),

the court,

in treating an

appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the State and
Department, ennunciated a vital rule, saying:
In solving the problems before this court, we
believe it is essential to keep in mind the
nature of this proceeding.
This is not an
action arising in the Superior Court under the
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Inc.,

broad, general jurisdiction of that court, but
rather on an appeal from an administrative
agency.
As such, we believe that the Superior
Court on appeal.could not enter a
which
the adm1n1strat1ve a enc below ha no authorit
to enter.
416 P.2d at 992 Emphasis ours,
The generally accepted principle is that when the court
t1nds that an administrative agency has acted in compliance with a
valid statute and has violated no principles of law applicable to the
proceedings,

it is the duty of the court to enforce the

administrative order in the manner provided by statute.

The court is

required to grant enforcement of the order where the agency has acted
properly within its designated sphere, has not acted contrary to law,
and its findings are sutained by adequate evidence; or where the
administrative agency has acted within its power, held a hearing
comporting with procedural due process, made findings based on
substantial evidence and provided an appropriate remedy.
Jur.

2nd, Administrative Law,

See 2 Am.

§516 and cases cited.

In his second, remaining prayer in Civil No. C-82-458,
Bennion asked the Court to set aside the Order in Cause No.
and to remand the cause to the Board directing it to enter
an Order providing that:
(b)
In the alternative, if this Court determines
that the production of the 2-8C5 Well is being
lawfully done, that Gulf provide an accounting to
Bennion on any and all salvage from the 1-8CS
Well and that Bennion receive a credit on his
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account for the present fair market value of said
salvage.
(R. at 5).
By specific Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, the
Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well was, and presently is, "shut-in" pending
further order of the Board.

It is a non-producing well;

it is

"shut-in'', but has not been plugged and abandoned.
At such time as the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well is plugged
and abandoned (and only at such time) and the equipment and material
therein recovered, saved,

identified and sold, Bennion will be

entitled to an accounting from Gulf of the salvage and will be
entitled to a credit to his account for his proportionate share of
the material and equipment so recovered, saved,

identified, etc.,

less whatever amounts have been charged against said account by the
operator, such as operating and production costs.
Any such demand by Bennion for a credit to his account for
the "present fair market value of the salvage" is improper and
premature.

Only at such time as the well is plugged and abandoned

and the salvage operation is undertaken, can such a value
determination and accounting be made.

Ill.

PROTECTION OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS

If we understand Appellant's argument in his Point I, he is
suggesting that the original order in Cause No. 139-8 which
established 640-acre spacing be modified to decrease the size of the
drilling units (App. Brief, page 9).
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In some way,

this would give

consirleration to the owners' economic concerns and presumably protect
correlative rights.
Section 8, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M. was
communitized under Communitization Agreement of September 11, 1974,
recorded September 16, 1974 in Book 136 M.R., pages 497-508.

That

Agreement was introduced in Civil No. C-80-7024 which file was
incorporated at the direction of the lower court with the file in
C-82-458.
That document discloses that there are at least 62 owners
of mineral interests in said Section 8; appellant is the owner of an
unleased, undivided 0.53153% mineral interest in and under the
subject section; there are 59 separate leaseholds committed to the
communitization agreement.

The mineral interest ownerships are not

undivided interests throughout the entire sections; rather, they are
divided interests and their participation in the production of oil
and gas is had on the basis of the ratio their respective ownerships
bear to the whole.
The costs of drilling, equipping and operating the No. 1
allocated to these various ownerships have long since been paid
out.

The costs and expenses of drilling and completing the No.

2

Well have been advanced by Gulf Oil Corporation, the operator, on
behalf of its various lessors and non-participating parties such as
Mr. Bennion, Appellant herein.
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When Bennion complains of the economic concerns of the
mineral owners and the further expense to such parties it becomes a
mockery - he has paid nothing.

It is true that a portion of the

production allocated to his mineral ownership is being credited
against his share of those costs for drilling and completing the No.
2 Well.
There are three aspects of this situation which appellant's
argument skirts and cannot address:

(a) His suggestions would create

an incredible confusion in the accounting for and payment of the
development costs and expenses;

(b) It ignores the accumulation of

a huge amount of evidence presented to the Board in numerous causes
since the promulgation of the order in Cause No. 139-8 which confirms
the wisdom of the Board in establishing 640-acre spacing units; and
(c) it would violate the correlative rights of the parties who are
mineral interest owners in the subject section and would erase the
contractual rights and interests of those mineral ownerships whose
interests were pooled under the communitization agreement of
September 14, 1974.
Appellant would re-write the law to his own dictates but if
he were to accomplish his stated end the question remains:
lies the benefit to him?

Wherein

His is the best of all possible worlds.

Someone else (Respondent) has advanced every penny for the drilling
of Well No. 1 and Well No.

2; someone else (Respondent) has taken
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all of the risks;

if he (Bennion) is to enjoy the fruits of someone

else's efforts and risks, he should be expected to pay the share of
costs and expenses attributable to his 0.53153% mineral ownership.
But that payment is not taken out of his pocket.

Rather,

it is

recouped by the operator out of a share of the production allocated
to Bennion's interest.

We emphasize not the entire share, because he

is entitled to the landowner's royalty of 1/8th.

Paragraph (8) of

the Order in Cause No. 139-20(B) provides that:
S. H. Bennion is entitled to receive and Gulf
shall tender a 1/8th cost-free royalty in kind
beginning with the first production of said
Albert Smith No. 2-8CS Well.
(R. at 17).
All these protections afforded by the legislature to the
parties, be they lessor, lessee, operator, or unleased mineral owner,
Appellant would destroy by his rewriting of the language of the Oil
and Gas Conservation Act.

He is a modern-day Sampson bent on

bringing down on his head and the heads of his co-mineral owners the
walls of a legislative scheme that has worked and worked well.

CONCLUSION
The Order of Dismissal in Civil No. C-80-7024, entered with
prejudice, is dispositive of the issues raised in Civil No. C-82-458
and said latter action is barred thereby.
Assuming, arguendo, that said action was not so barred, the
lower Court properly held that the Board acted properly and within
the scope of its authority in granting its Order in Cause No.
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139-20[B].

The lower court properly refused to order the Board to

violate the mandate of the statute under which it was created; it
properly refused to direct the Board to disregard its own findings,
conclusions and order, based upon evidentiary hearings which
conformed with procedura 1 due process, to re instate the product ion of
an uneconomic well (No. 1 Well) and shut-in a well (No. 2 Well) which
was then in production and capable of commercial production.

The

judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
RESPt:CTFULLY SUBMITTED t1is

vv

August, 1983.
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